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CLOSE UP ON 
THE NEWS
1. The Abe government and the gender 
equality issue: “towards a society 
where women shine” 2
- Amélie Corbel
Regardless of the attention it attracts, the 
notion of “a country’s place in the world” 
is generally held to designate its economic 
power and political influence. And yet, in this 
age of benchmarking3, it seems every domain 
is the subject of one international ranking 
or another. From traditional areas such as 
economics to education and innovation, 
more and more sectors are becoming the 
2 In Japanese, josei ga kagayaku shakai he: the slogan 
of the campaign promoting jobs for women launched in 
spring 2013 by the Abe government.
3  Benchmarking: in the field of international rankings, 
this  can  be  defined  as  “a  tool  for  the  comparative 
evaluation of national metrics based on  the definition, 
quantification and calibration of common performance 
indicators”; the implicit objective is for the “bad” pupils 
to learn from the “good” pupils. For a critical appraisal 
of the notion of benchmarking, see Isabelle Bruno and 
Emmanuel Didier, Benchmarking - L’État sous pression 
statistique, Paris, La Découverte, 2013.
object of measurement, evaluation and, 
naturally, rankings. These league tables are 
typically compiled by consulting firms or 
analysts commissioned to carry them out, or 
by international agencies which evaluate all 
entities included in the ranking through the lens 
of a standardized set of metrics. One point that 
most have in common is that they leave to one 
side the question of how suitable a “single” 
metric – conceived in a particular country, but 
applied to radically diverse local contexts – is 
for evaluating perceptions as subjective as 
“quality of urban living” or the “liveability” of a 
city. Nevertheless, we might also argue that 
since they are based on the measurement of 
the salary levels rankings and occupational 
ranks of men and women in each individual 
country, gender equality rankings provide 
a useful starting point for comparisons and 
debate on why a given country scores so well 
– or so poorly – in the ranking4. 
While Japan’s level of development ensures it 
a high placing in many international rankings, 
4 The author thanks Sophie Buhnik for her input on the 
development and use of rankings.
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the risk of bias in favour of the more developed 
countries.7 This method therefore allows the 
Philippines to reach fifth place in the ranking, 
with a score of 0.7832 (2013) – well ahead 
of Japan, which occupies the 105th position 
with a score of  0.650. A cursory analysis 
of Japanese results allows us to state the 
following: while Japan scores very well in the 
areas of health and education8, its performance 
in the business and political spheres is very 
poor. The limited presence of women in 
positions of leadership – in business as well 
as politics – and an employment market which 
remains largely two-track9 are the main causes 
of this situation. While this situation is far from 
specific to Japan, it is much stronger than in 
other developed countries, with only a few 
exceptions10. Nevertheless, not all international 
gender equality indexes place Japan among the 
“bad” pupils. For example, the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Gender Inequality 
Index (GII), which addresses such domains as 
reproductive health, empowerment and the 
labour market11, ranked Japan in 21st position 
7 Several gender equality indexes combine absolute 
and relative values. One example is the Gender-related 
Development Index (GrDI) created in 1995 by the UNDP.
8 Indicators for the health domain: sex ratio at birth and life 
expectancy; indicators for the education domain: literacy 
rates, primary/secondary/higher education enrolment rates.
9 Note for example the gap of 25-30% between male 
and female employment rates. The GGGI figures report 
a ratio of 0.74 (85% against 63%). Other indicators (GII, 
see below) report ratios of 0.68 (71.1% against 49.4%).
10 One example is South Korea, where the situation is 
similar.
11  More specifically,  the GII measures: [reproductive 
health]: maternal mortality rates and fertility rates 
among adolescents (15-19 years old); [empowerment]: 
percentage of seats in parliament and proportion 
of population with secondary or higher education; 
[labour market]:  employment  rates  among women  of 
working age. For more details, see the UNDP human 
development reports: http://hdr.undp.org/fr/content/
rapport-sur-le-d %C3 %A9veloppement-humain-2013 
(in French).
there is one domain where the available data 
singles Japan out for a position well down in 
the ranking. This domain is gender equality. 
In its 2013 edition, the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Gender Gap Report ranked Japan 
in 105th position in a total of 136 countries 
hardly a flattering score for the world’s third-
biggest economy. And as it does every year, 
it has attracted considerable media coverage. 
Japan’s poor performance in gender equality 
issues is regularly underlined by various 
international organizations. Recent reports by 
the IMF and investment bank Goldman Sachs5 
attracted much attention from the Japanese 
government and business world, as they 
stressed the loss to the economy signified 
by low employment rates among Japanese 
married women. The impact of these 
reports was not without consequences for 
Abe Shinzō’s government, which announced 
in spring 2013 that female employment would 
be at the heart of its growth strategy.
The state of play on gender inequality in 
Japan
Before turning to government policy, let’s 
briefly look over the gender equality situation 
in Japan. Of the various gender equality 
indexes, by far the most influential is the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 
(GGGI). Launched in 2006, the GGGI is a 
composite index which expresses the gender 
gap in terms of a score between 0 and 1. 
A score of 1 means perfect equality; a score 
of 0 means absolute inequality6. The GGGI 
merely expresses the gap between genders 
(i.e. in relative terms) and not the absolute 
levels attained by either gender in the 
evaluated domains, a method which reduces 
5 Can Women Save Japan? (IMF, October 2012) and 
Womenomics 3.0: The Time Is Now (Goldman Sachs, 
2010).
6 In 2013, the best score was 0.8731 (Iceland) and the 
worst 0.5128 (Yemen).
Japan Analysis  • 5
out of 145 countries in its 2013 edition.12 
This ranking might seem to contradict the 
findings of the GGGI, but it principally reflects 
the good Japanese performance in areas 
such as the reproductive health of women;13 
and the GII also confirms the country’s poor 
performance in terms of gender equality of 
participation in the spheres of business and 
politics.
Can Women Save Japan?14
While gender inequalities in politics have not 
received the attention they have received 
in other countries,15 the same cannot be 
said of inequalities in the business sphere. 
The interest shown by the media and senior 
business management in female employment 
can be partly explained by the relation which 
has been established between female 
participation rates in the labour market 
and the economic health of a country. 
This relation has been extensively addressed in 
the last five or ten years in various reports from 
international institutions (such as the IMF and 
World Bank) and major private groups (notably 
Goldman Sachs). Japan is regularly mentioned 
in these reports: it is viewed as one of the 
developed countries whose economy would 
most benefit from greater gender equality in 
the occupational sphere. In concrete terms, 
it’s estimated that closing the gender inequality 
gap in employment would increase Japan’s 
12 UNDP Human Development Report (available 
online). 2012 figures.
13  Sugibashi  Yayoi,  “Kokuren  kaihatsu  keikaku  ga 
teishō suru atarashii gendā fubyōdō shisū _ dētā kakō no 
otoshiana ” [The new gender inequality index proposed 
by the UNDP: the data processing trap], Cutting-Edge, 
no. 40-41, February 2011 (available online).
14 To echo the title of the IMF report of October 2012.
15 In France, for instance, where debates in gender 
parity are the norm.
GDP by anywhere between 9 and 15%.16 
Behind these figures are a number of precepts 
which are common to all of the reports, starting 
with those published by the IMF (for example 
“Can Women Save Japan?” from  2012) 
and Goldman Sachs (“Womenomics 3.0: 
The Time Is now”, from 2010). The first, on 
the macroeconomic level, maintains that 
Japan must find new sources of labour if it 
wants to offset the impactof the reduction 
in its active population on its economy.17 
To do so, two options are open to it: either it 
recruits foreign labour, or it taps into its “most 
underexploited resource”18 – women.19 Given 
the political difficulties inherent in an ambitious 
migration policy, the second option looks 
more promising in the short term. With female 
employment rates of 65.6% against 85.1% for 
men (according to data from March 2014),20 
the labour market needs to take on 
16 An IMF note of September 2013 (Work and 
the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender 
Equality) estimates an increase of 9% in Japanese 
GDP (p. 4), based on the research of Aguirre et al. 
(Empowering the Third Billion. Women and the World 
of Work in 2012, 2012, Booz and Company). The 15% 
estimate is based on research by Kevin Daly (GS Global 
ECS Research) and is cited in the latest report from 
Goldman Sachs.
17 The population of working age in Japan (15-64 years 
of age) is expected to fall from 87 million in 1995 (the 
historic maximum) to 55 million by 2050 (figures taken 
from the IMF report Can Women Save Japan?, 2012).
18 Matsui Kathy et al., Japan: Portfolio Strategy – 
Womenomics 3.0: The Time is Now, Goldman Sachs, 
October 2010, p. 1.
19 To these two options a third is frequently added: 
senior citizen employment (+65 years). This option is 
not examined in the reports cited here.
20 The author’s calculations on the population 
aged between 15 and 64, based on the data from 
the  survey  “Rōdōryokuchōsa  (kihonshūkei)  – 
March  2014  –  shūgyōjōtaibetsu  15  saiijōjinkō, 
sangyōbetsushūgyōshasū”  [the  Japanese government’s 
bureau of statistics]. By way of comparison, 
employment rates in France are 74.8% for men and 
66.2% for women: a gap of 8.6 points.
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7.5 million women if female employment rates 
are to reach parity with male. This second 
option promises not only more numerous 
but also better-qualified labour, for Japanese 
women have on average pursued their studies 
longer than men21. The second precept 
underpinning these reports is microeconomic 
in character, and holds that businesses would 
have much to gain from recruiting more 
women and promoting them to positions of 
responsibility. With only 11.9% of leadership 
posts occupied by women22 against almost 
43% in the United States and a little less 
than 40% in France,23 the decision-making 
process in Japanese businesses remains 
largely off-limits to women, even if the situation 
is improving.24 For business, these figures 
come at a cost: they mean restricted access 
to skilled labour, and poorer performance 
in markets dominated by women. Greater 
diversity in Japanese enterprises would lead to 
a greater diversity of opinion and prepare the 
way for “new perspectives to open up”. That, 
at least, is what we are led to conclude by these 
reports, which argue in favour of “diversity”25 in 
the business environment. But the challenges 
facing Japan in its efforts to close the gender 
21 Steinberg Chad, Nakane Masato, Can Women Save 
Japan?, IMF working paper, 2012, p. 5.
22 Taken from the MHLW survey 
“  koyōkintōkihonchōsa  -  2011  (kakuhō)  -  kigyō 
chosa” [Baseline  sur  vey  on  equality  in  employment 
(2011 edition): based on enterprise survey data].
23 Data from IMF (op. cit., p. 18) and Goldman Sachs 
(op. cit., p. 18) reports.
24 In 1989, the proportion of positions of leadership 
occupied by women was 5.0%; in 2003, 8.2%; and in 
2006, 10.5% (source: MHLW report, loc. cit.).
25  “Discourse on the management of diversity emerged 
in the United States in the 1990s, as it broke free from 
the moral and legalistic dimensions which characterize 
discourse  on  affirmative  action,  and  increasingly 
found  a  place  in  the  rhetoric  of  economic  efficiency” 
(quoted in Bereni Laure, « Le discours de la diversité 
en entreprise: genèse et appropriations », Sociologies 
pratiques, 2/2011 (no. 23), pp. 9-24).
equality gap in the professional sphere are 
considerable. Low rates of female occupancy 
of positions of leadership and the gap 
between employment rates among men and 
women were mentioned above. To these we 
must add that 70% of “casual” jobs26 – which 
account for 35% of all jobs – are occupied by 
women.27 This predominance of females in so-
called “casual” employment – a phenomenon 
which is far from specific to Japan – follows 
a distinct pattern in terms of breakdown by 
age groups: the percentage of women in 
“casual” employment increases gradually 
from the age of 30, peaking in the 45-49 age 
group and falling off as women leave the 
employment market. This pattern is not 
found in the male population, where “casual” 
employment tends to be the preserve of men 
in their twenties and sixties. The discontinuity 
in the occupational lifecycle of women is also 
reflected in the persistence of the “M-shaped 
curve”28 that is specific to female employment 
in Japan. Even today, six in every ten women 
leave their jobs when their first child is born. 
26 Casual jobs (hisei)  include  employment  on fixed-
term  contracts,  temporary  employment,  “odd  jobs” 
(arubaito) and part-time employment.
27  Source:  2012  figures  from  the  government’s 
statistics department, “Rōdōryoku chōsa no kekka wo 
mirusai no pointo n° 16 - hiseiki no yaku 7 wari ha 
joseigashimeru”  [Salient  points  in  the  findings  of  the 
survey on labour, point no. 16: almost 70% of “casual” 
employees are women], 19 February 2013, p. 4.
28 Employment rates among Japanese women increase 
rapidly  as  women  enter  their  first  jobs,  reaching  a 
maximum of 77.6% in the 25-29 age group. This peak 
is followed by a trough where female employment rates 
drop off by 10 percentage points, as young mothers 
leave the employment market. After dedicating several 
years to bringing up their children, these women then 
return to paid employment, most frequently in the form 
of “casual” labour. This phenomenon causes a new spike 
in female employment, which reaches a second peak of 
75.7% in the 45-49 age group. Represented in graphic 
form, this employment pattern forms a distinctive 
M  shape  (source:  MHLW  report  “Hataraku  josei  no 
jitsujō” [The situation of working women], 2012).
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This metric has remained unchanged since 
the latter half of the 1980s.29 While the number 
of women leaving their jobs before pregnancy 
(often on the occasion of their marriage) has 
fallen by approximately 10 percentage points 
in the last 25 years, the number of women 
who leave work when they become pregnant 
with their first child has remained the same.30 
Among the reasons most often cited for this 
phenomenon are the desire to dedicate time 
to household chores and bringing up children 
(34% of women on permanent employment 
contracts; 48% of women in “casual“ 
employment), over-long or irregular working 
hours (26% and 9%  respectively), absence 
of measures enabling reconciliation of family 
and professional life (21%, 8%), health-
related issues (15%, 19%) and dismissal or 
invitation to resign by employers (14%, 8%).31 
Looking over these figures, we can see that 
the withdrawal of young mothers from the 
employment market is as much a conscious 
choice to dedicate all their time to bringing up 
their new-born children as a “default” decision, 
29  These figures are for the 2005-09 period: For every 100 
women in work before their first pregnancy, only 38 will 
still be in employment when their first child celebrates its 
first birthday. The other 62 women will have left their jobs 
during their pregnancy or after giving birth. These figures 
are broadly similar to those for the 1985-89 period, when 
only 39% of women remained in their careers after the birth 
of their first child (source: MHLW report “Hataraku josei 
no jitsujō” [The situation of working women], 2011).
30 One change is worth noting: the increase in the 
number of women taking maternity leave. In 1996, 49% 
of women in employment at the time of their childbirth 
took maternity  leave. This  figure  had  risen  to  72% by 
2005. In 2008, the symbolic threshold of 90% was passed. 
Since then, the figure has fallen slightly to 83.6% in 2012 
(source:  MHLW,  “kōyō  kintō  kihon  chōsa”  [Baseline 
survey on employment equality], 2012).
31  These figures are taken from a survey by Mitsubishi 
UFJ Research & Consulting, Iku jikyū gyōsei donado ni 
kansuru jittai wa aku no tame no chōsa (rōdōsha ankēto 
chōsa) [Survey on the situation relative to the parental 
leave and other systems (employee survey)], 2011. 
Multiple responses were possible.
for professional life remains difficult to reconcile 
with family life for a majority of women. 
Increasing the employment rates of the female 
population therefore involves implementing 
measures ensuring greater equilibrium 
between family and professional life, which 
would reduce the “default” departures from 
the employment market.
Womenomics – the cornerstone of the 
Abe government’s growth strategy
All of this leads us to turn our attention to the 
recent conversion of Japan’s Prime Minister, 
Abe Shinzō, to the appeals of Womenomics. 
In an opinion piece published in the Wall Street 
Journal in September 2013,32 Abe wrote: 
“Unleashing the potential of Womenomics 
is an absolute must if Japan’s growth is to 
continue.” A few months earlier, in an eagerly-
awaited speech on his growth strategy, Abe 
had declared that creating a society which 
would allow “the skills which slumber in the 
depth of women to awake and blossom”, 
those “human resources [which Japan is slow 
to] put to good use”33, was the key to renewed 
growth. Declarations like these recall the reports 
of the IMF and Goldman Sachs, and with good 
reason: they are directly inspired by them. In 
his article in the Wall Street Journal, Abe made 
no attempt to hide this,34 acknowledging his 
32  Abe Shinzō, “Unleashing the Power of ‘Womenomics’”, 
Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2013.
33  Abe Shinzō, “seichōsenryaku no supīchi”  [Speech on 
growth strategy], 19 April 2013.
34  “I have no idea who first coined the word ‘Abenomics’. 
[…] I do know, however, who first promoted one concept 
that is a vital component of Abenomics: ‘Womenomics’. In 
1999, Kathy Matsui and her colleagues at Goldman Sachs 
first advocated that Japan could increase its gross domestic 
product by as much as 15% simply by tapping its most 
underutilized resource – Japanese women. Fourteen years 
have elapsed since then, and the idea has finally entered 
Japan’s  political  lexicon  […]”Abe  Shinzō,  “Unleashing 
the  Power  of  ‘Womenomics”,  Wall Street Journal, 
25 September 2013.
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introduce regulations requiring that at least 
one woman sit on the boards of directors of 
Japanese companies. The programme also 
includes the introduction of a parental leave 
period of three years (at present, this leave lasts 
one year), with the objective of securing the 
return to the employment market of women 
and men who wish to dedicate more than a 
year to bringing up their children. However, 
it is important to note that all the measures 
announced by the Japanese premier are no 
more than proposals, and will not be formalized 
by legislation, as Abe made clear in his speech 
of 19 April 2013. With no law to enforce their 
application, the adoption of these proposals 
will depend on the good will of employers.
Change is coming, but to what extent?
What emerges from this brief overview of 
the situation is that female employment is 
a central element – if not the core element 
– of the economic policy of Japan’s current 
government. It is a statement of intent 
which must have surprised more than one 
commentator, Abe Shinzō – and more generally 
the Jimintō – being known for their conservative 
views on social issues. An illustration of this is 
the central importance attached to the family, 
“the natural building block of society”,38 as a 
unit whose role in terms of social solidarity 
must be respected. According to this view, 
excessive state encroachment threatens 
to undermine not only the family but society 
as a whole. The Jimintō promotes an ideal 
of society that has long constituted an 
obstacle to the implementation of measures 
advancing the employment of women, and 
more particularly women who are married with 
children. For if it is to function correctly in the 
social role assigned to it, the family needs a 
caregiver in its midst. The family model which 
implicitly reflects this ideal typically takes the 
38  Constitutional  reform  bill  by  Jimintō  (LDP) 
dated 2012, article 24, paragraph 1.
debt to the work of Kathy Matsui and her team 
at Goldman Sachs35. 
Among the measures announced by the 
Japanese prime minister was a national plan 
addressing the scarcity of daycare facilities for 
young children. Under this plan, approximately 
45,000 daycare places were to be created.36 
This emergency plan has the particularity 
of including deregulation, and is based on 
the lessons of the “Yokohama model”.37 
Another key vector of the Abe government’s 
programme is increased support for women 
looking to return to work after a period of 
economic inactivity – maternity leave or longer 
breaks. This package includes incentives 
for the creation of businesses by women 
seeking to turn to account the experience 
and knowhow they have accumulated in their 
years at home. These government measures 
have been accompanied by an appeal to the 
cooperation of employers in the promotion 
of women and the provision of maternity 
allowances. Japan’s prime minister has set 
the target of tripling the presence of women 
in positions of responsibility to reach the 30% 
mark by 2020, and has called on the country’s 
three leading employers’ associations to 
35 Kathy Matsui and her team published the report 
Womenomics: Buy the Female Economy in 1999. It was 
followed by two further reports, Womenomics: Japan’s 
Hidden Asset (2005) and Womenomics 3.0: The Time is 
Now, (Goldman Sachs, 2010).
36 The situation as of 1 October 2013. Source: MHLW.
37 Three years after being the Japanese city with the 
longest waiting lists for daycare places, in spring 2013 
Yokohama announced that it had reached its objective 
of  “zero  children  on  the  waiting  list”.  Thanks  to  the 
action of its mayor, Fumiko Hayashi, elected in 2009, 
Yokohama has worked actively to increase the number 
of  places  in  daycare.  In  addition  to  the  “classic” 
responses – increased budgetary allocation to childcare, 
creation  of more  daycare  centres  – Abe’s  programme 
has also opened the daycare market to private enterprise 
and  relaxed  the  regulations  on  obtaining  official 
certification.
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form of a man who is the breadwinner, and a 
woman who stays at home and is in charge of 
bringing up the children and looking after their 
grandparents.
The importance accorded the family as a 
bastion of social solidarity also finds expression 
in the proposals of the Abe government we 
examined above. On several occasions, 
Japan’s premier has underlined the value of 
the experience acquired by women at home, 
and has declared himself to be especially 
inspired by the example of women who have 
translated their knowhow in the caregiving 
domain into viable business projects. 
The measures for promoting business 
initiatives by women have to be seen in 
this context. More generally, the measures 
announced by the Abe government seek to 
address the needs of a female population of 
diverse profiles. The increase in the number 
of daycare places is principally directed at 
mothers who want to return to work quickly; 
the proposed extension of the parental 
leave period is addressed at women who 
want to dedicate more time to their children 
with the assurance that they can return to 
their jobs after their maternity leave; and the 
measures designed to promote the return to 
the employment market are aimed at women 
who opted to take an extended break from 
the employment market to devote themselves 
to bringing up their children. Of these three 
possible life choices, none is promoted at the 
expense of the others; all are “respectable 
career choices”.
Despite the factors putting a brake on the 
“revolutionary” character of the Japanese 
prime minister’s proposals, it seems evident 
that Abe’s government is committed to a 
family policy more favourable to women. 
The economics and the largely utilitarian 
discourse of Womenomics seem to have 
won over even a conservative like Abe. The 
groundwork was already in place, however. 
In an article published in 2011 – well before 
Womenomics became part of the Japanese 
government’s agenda – the researchers 
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Tuulla Toivonen39 
examined the reasons why Japan, a country 
reputed to be conservative in the sphere of 
family policy, had come since the 2000s to 
progressively adopt measures in favour of the 
employment of women with young children.40 
With the arrival of the new millennium, 
successive Japanese administrations began 
to encourage businesses and corporations 
to show more consideration to the needs of 
families; debate on the reconciliation of family 
and professional life began to gain momentum; 
and, in an unprecedented development, the 
points of view of fathers began to be taken 
into account. Demographic factors alone were 
not enough to explain this change, the authors 
stressed. The emergence of new economic 
concerns must also be considered: “Although 
it can potentially be linked with a variety of 
considerations, [this] pleading in favour of an 
improved equilibrium [between professional 
and family life] is often made in direct reference 
to human capital concerns.”41 This trend was 
already visible in the 2000s, and has gathered 
momentum under Abe. Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Toivonen conclude that these changes 
nevertheless raise questions “on the identity 
of the people on whose behalf these policies 
are implemented and whether the principles 
of gender equality will be able to support the 
39 Seeleib-Kaiser Martin and Toivonen Tuukka, 
“Promoting  Gender  Equality,  Birthrates,  or  Human 
Capital? Germany, Japan and Family Policy Discourse” 
in Coulmas Florian and Lützeler Ralph (eds.), Imploding 
Populations in Japan and Germany – a Comparison, 
Brill, Leiden, 2011, pp. 175-201.
40 The 1990s saw some progress towards the 
employment of women with young children, such as the 
introduction of the law on parental leave in 1992, and 
the implementation of the first (1994) and second (1999) 
Angel plans for increasing the number of daycare places.
41 Op. cit. p. 181.
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weight of economic, and principally utilitarian, 
imperatives […].42
Abe’s government seems to have crossed 
a watershed with regard to female 
unemployment, and it is a move which has 
divided opinion. Some are optimistic; others 
have their misgivings. Japan’s prime minister 
nevertheless deserves credit for stimulating 
debate on a national level. Given its historic 
weight and its influence in business circles, the 
declaration of intent of the Jimintō is especially 
important. While it’s still too early to gauge the 
concrete effects of the measures announced 
in spring 2013, other reforms are now on 
the table. The emergence of the debate 
on the future of the dependent exemption 
tax rebate43, and the proposals for the 
deregulation of working hours (rōdōjikan kisei 
kanwa) are currently receiving considerable 
media attention. One thing is certain: future 
developments are going to be interesting.
42 Seeleib-Kaiser Martin and Toivonen Tuukka, op. cit., 
p. 200.
43  “Shushō  ga  haigūshakōjō  nado    no  minaoshi 
kentō  wo  shij”  [The  prime  minister  backs  revision 
of dependent exemption], Nenkin jitsumu, 
7 April 2014, no. 2088, pp. 17-18.
